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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S INHERENT AUTHORITY DOES NOT
EXTEND TO THE TRANSFER OF VENUE IN THIS CASE.
District courts do not have unbridled inherent authority to override applicable

statutes and rules. Respondents’ brief fails to even address the scope of the inherent
authority of district courts in this State and instead simply reiterates that district courts
have some inherent authority and that there are ostensible benefits to the transfer of Davis
County’s case away from a proper venue. (Respondents’ Brief, 11-13.)
There is no dispute that “courts maintain a certain degree of inherent power to
properly discharge their duties.” W. Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, ¶ 42, 184 P.3d 578.
However, that inherent power is necessarily limited where a statute or rule applies. See,
e.g., In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 (1913) (holding that a court’s inherent
powers “may, within certain limits, be abridged, and the procedure with respect to the
exercise of them be regulated, by legislation”); Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 50, 100
P.3d 1177 (cleaned up) (holding that “[c]ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation
to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments
required for the performance of their judicial duties”); W. Water, 2008 UT 18 at ¶ 42
(holding that the “certain degree of inherent power [Utah courts have] to properly
discharge their duties” stems from and is therefore “limited by statute or constitution”).
Statutes enacted by the legislature and the rules and case law promulgated by this
Court constitute the outer bounds of a court’s inherent authority. Indeed, the scope of
“authority is not a matter for the courts to define at our preference and whim.” Utah
1

Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 20, 289 P.3d
582. The scope of a court’s inherent authority is properly limited by statutes and rules,
rather than determined by each court on an ad hoc basis. Thus the district court’s ruling,
relying on its inherent authority to transfer Davis County’s case outside the bounds of the
venue statute, is erroneous.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION DID NOT REST ON RULE 42.
Respondents’ attempt to shoehorn the district court’s ruling into a Rule 42 analysis

is as perplexing as it is spurious. Respondents erroneously argue that the district court’s
order can be affirmed, even in the absence of inherent authority to transfer venue,
because the “rules provide for an alternative source of power for the court’s temporary
consolidation order,” specifically Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Respondents’ Brief, 13.) Respondents’ brief actually argues that, “[a]lthough it did not
cite the rule directly, the district court invoked the powers granted by rule 42.”
(Respondents’ Brief, 14.) To be clear, the district court did not invoke Rule 42 in granting
the motion to transfer venue, and it explicitly denied the separate motion to consolidate
brought under Rule 42. Reliance on Rule 42 cannot be inferred from the Venue Order,
particularly where the only mention of the rule in that order is a statement that another
court had declined to consolidate opioid cases outside of its judicial district under Rule
42. (R. 6875.) The district court explicitly set forth its reasoning and authority in its
Venue Order:
Accordingly, this Court, exercising its inherent authority to manage its cases and
dockets, concludes that a limited transfer of venue for pretrial proceedings will
promote the ends of justice and the efficient administration of pending cases and
2

dockets. Therefore, the Court transfers the venue of pre-trial proceedings only, to
Summit County in Utah’s Third District Court.”
(R. 6877.) The district court emphatically did not rely on Rule 42 in making its ruling to
transfer venue.
Even if the Venue Order can somehow be read to implicitly rely on Rule 42, Rule
42 does not grant a district court any authority to transfer venue of a case, and it does not
permit consolidation of any case outside of a court’s geographical district. Rule 42 only
allows a district court to consolidate actions that are already “pending before” it when
those actions involve common questions of law or fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). 1
Under the rules of statutory interpretation, the phrase “pending before the court” in
Rule 42 must be read to refer not to the level of district court in general but to individual
geographical district courts. This Court interprets “court rules, like statutes and
administrative rules, according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14,
¶ 19, 133 P.3d 370. This Court further has a “duty to read and interpret statutory
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other related
statutes.” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 9, 217 P.3d 265.
The idea that cases “pending before the court” under Rule 42 necessarily means
cases pending before the same geographical district court is supported by both the plain

1

On February 22, 2019, the Summit County district court heard arguments from
Defendants in this case (and in other opioid cases) that all of the opioid cases in Utah
should be consolidated under Rule 42. (Add. B, 2.) Davis County argued that the Summit
County Court did not have the authority to cross the geographical district lines to
consolidate all of the cases in question, including Davis County’s case. This is because
Rule 42 only offers this power in relation to actions that “are pending before the court.”
Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a).
3

language of the rule and by reading that phrase in harmony with the rest of the provisions
of the rule. Rule 42(a)(1) states that “[t]he presiding judge may assign the case to another
judge for good cause.” Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). This reference to a presiding judge only
makes sense if the rule is referring to the geographical district courts. A presiding judge is
assigned to preside over each geographical district court within Utah. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-5-106. The presiding judge in one judicial district does not have the authority
to assign cases from its district to a judge outside of its district, nor does the presiding
judge have the authority to reach outside of its district to take cases away from another
judicial district. Thus, Rule 42, under its plain meaning and to give meaning to the rest of
its provisions, necessarily refers to individual geographic district courts when it refers to
cases “pending before the court.”
Respondents’ arguments to the contrary are not well taken. First, there is no
support either in the rule itself or in case law for the idea that Rule 42 implicitly allows a
court to transfer a case away rather than consolidate cases before it. Second, harmonizing
rules and statutes related to transferring and consolidating cases indicates that Rule 42 is
limited to cases before the same geographical district. Respondents argue that the judicial
districts in the state of Utah “are best understood as administrative boundaries that carry
no substantive weight” and that the “district lines do not segregate the district court into
individual district courts distinct from one another.” However, this is an untenable
interpretation of the geographical divisions of the district courts in Utah, under both Rule
42 and other Utah law. Section 78A-5-101 of the Utah Code distinguishes between “the
district court,” which “is a trial court of general jurisdiction,” and “a district court,”
4

which “shall be located in the county seat of each county.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5101(1), (4). Further, the Utah Constitution provides that “[g]eographic divisions for all
courts of record except the Supreme Court may be provided by statute.” Utah Const. art
VIII, § 6; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-1-102 (“The district and juvenile courts shall
be divided into eight geographical divisions.”) It would be nonsensical and superfluous to
assume that the geographical divisions of the courts of the state of Utah carry no
substantive weight when both rules and statutes rely on those geographical divisions.
Because the language of Rule 42(a) is plain on its face, there is very little Utah
case law interpreting the rule and virtually none directly on point. In fact, Davis County
has been unable to find a case in Utah based on Rule 42(a) where cases pending in
different jurisdictions were involuntarily consolidated in a different district from where
the plaintiff originally filed. There is, however, some relevant federal case law. Indeed, it
is well-settled that Utah Rule 42(a) was patterned after Federal Rule 42(a). 2 “Because the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
where there is little Utah law interpreting a specific rule, we may [also] look to the
2

In fact, prior to December 1, 2007, the portions of Utah Rule 42(a) and Federal Rule
42(a) at issue were identical. The pertinent part of both rules read as follows: “When
actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (eff. July 1,
1966); Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2003 (current)). Although Federal Rule 42(a)
was subsequently amended on December 1, 2007, “as part of the general restyling of the
Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology
consistent throughout the rules.[,]” these changes were “intended to be stylistic only.” See
Notes of Advisory Committee on 2007 Amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. Therefore, for
all intents and purposes, the pertinent parts of Utah Rule 42(a) and Federal Rule 42(a) are
identical.
5

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance.” 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC v.
Dos Lagos, LLC, 2017 UT 29, ¶ 18 n.4, 408 P.3d 313 (internal citations omitted).
Federal Rule 42(a), like Utah Rule 42(a), allows a district judge to order
consolidation of actions “before the court” that “involve a common question of law or
fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The federal rule has been consistently construed to prohibit
consolidation of actions not pending before the same court, in other words pending in
different geographical districts, 3 even within the same state. 4 The United States District
Court for the District of Utah reached the same result. Calder v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No.
2:07-CV-387-TC-PMW, 2010 WL 2639971, at *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63934, at

3

See, e.g., Swindell-Dressler Corporation v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3rd Cir.
1962) (“a cause of action pending in one jurisdiction cannot be consolidated with a cause
of action pending in another jurisdiction. [Rule 42(a)] will not permit such a course. The
cases to be consolidated must be 'pending before the court.’”); Oregon Egg Producers v.
Andrew, 458 F.2d 382, 383 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Rule 42 applies to cases that are properly
before the same court. Because this case is not properly before the district court in
Washington, Rule 42 cannot be invoked.”); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for consolidation only where the two actions ‘are pending before the
court.’ By no stretch of the imagination can the Alabama action be considered as now
pending before the New York court[.]”); Silver v. Goodman, 234 F. Supp. 415 (D. Conn.
1964) (“Rule 42(a) pertains only to the consolidation of actions pending before the same
court; it does not authorize transfer of a cause to a different district for consolidation with
a case pending in the transferee court.”); Cummings v. ConGlobal Indus., Inc., No. 07CV-409-TCK-SAJ, 2008 WL 656000, at *2, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17634, at *4-8 (N.D.
Okla. Mar. 6, 2008) (affirming sanctions for failing to identify valid legal basis to support
Motion to Consolidate as even a “cursory review of the plain language of Rule 42(a)
indicate[s] that both cases must be pending before the same court in order for
consolidation to be proper” and “relevant authority discussing Rule 42(a) also makes this
point clear.”).
4
Espanol v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, No. 8:10-CV-944-T-35-AEP, 2012 WL
12902912, at *1-2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195970, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012)
(holding that the court lacked authority under Rule 42(a) to consolidate cases pending in
other district courts, including another district court within the same state).
6

*10-11 (D. Utah June 28, 2010) (holding that an action pending in federal district court in
Utah could not be consolidated with an action before federal district court in Texas). 5 In
addition, other state courts interpreting language similar to Utah’s Rule 42(a) have
reached the same conclusion. 6
When faced with this same evidence related to the limits of Rule 42, both the
Third District Court and the Second District Court declined to use Rule 42 to consolidate
cases outside of their own geographical district boundaries. The Summit County court
declined to “use an untested interpretation of Rule 42 to consolidate matters pending in
other judicial districts” and consolidated only those opioid cases pending in the Third
Judicial District. (Add. B, 4-6.) The Davis County district court in this case cited the
Summit County ruling and stated that “it is not appropriate for this Court to consider
taking a position that would be inconsistent with the position already taken in the Summit
County case on the issue of consolidation of cases from outside the Third District.” (R.
6875, 6877.)
In sum, Respondents’ argument on Rule 42 relies on unfounded conjecture that the
district court relied on Rule 42 in transferring Davis County’s case. The district court
5

All unreported cases cited in this brief are attached hereto in Addendum D.
See, e.g., Figg & Muller Engineers, Inc. v. Petruska, 477 N.E.2d 968, 970-971 (Ind.
App. 1985) (affirming trial court ruling that Rule 42 did not authorize consolidation of
cases pending in two different counties and holding “the plain language of Trial Rule
42(A) authorizes only consolidation of actions pending before the court, it does not
authorize transfer of actions from one court’s jurisdiction to that of another for
consolidation”); Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1168 (Ind. 1989), abrogated on other
grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (acknowledging the holding of
the Indiana Court of Appeals in Figg & Muller Engineers, Inc. and stating “[w]e see no
basis to disturb that holding as it comports with the plain language of the statute[.]”).
6
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unquestionably did not rely on Rule 42, and any parsing of that rule need not be
undertaken. But, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, Rule 42 does not get
Respondents anywhere. Rule 42 as written and as interpreted only permits courts to
consolidate cases pending before it in its own geographical judicial district and does not
permit a court to unilaterally transfer cases to courts outside its judicial district.
III.

THE UTAH CHANGE OF VENUE STATUTE IS VALID AND PROHIBITS
THE TRANSFER MADE IN THIS CASE.
Respondents’ attempt to distract this Court with speculative constitutional

arguments is unavailing.
First, as Respondents note, this Court must “avoid addressing a constitutional
issue unless required to do so,” particularly where, as here, “the case can be decided on
the preferred grounds of statutory construction.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah
1982). Notably, Respondents shy away from the venue statute itself, and indeed invite
this Court to “put[] aside the text of the statute.” (Respondents’ Brief, 18.) This is
because the venue statute prohibits the transfer of venue of Davis County’s case to
Summit County. The governing rules of statutory construction provide that this Court
must start with “the plain language of the statute itself” and “presume that the expression
of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.” Marion Energy, Inc. v.
KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. The plain language of the change of
venue statute allows a transfer for trial where one of four grounds applies. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-309. The statute, on its face, does not permit a transfer for pretrial
discovery alone; a case transferred under the statute is transferred for all further
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proceedings, up to and including trial. In Davis County’s case there is not even a
colorable argument that one of the four grounds apply, and, under the rules of statutory
interpretation, the venue statute must be read to prohibit the transfer for pretrial
proceedings. (See Petitioner’s Brief, § I.)
Second, the venue statute does not present a separation of powers issue. It is clear
that the current provisions of Utah’s constitution grant this Court, the Utah Supreme
Court, the power to make rules of procedure and evidence:
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature.
Utah Const. art VIII, § 4. This grant of power, however, is not exclusive. The constitution
also grants the legislature the ability to make those same rules, as long as it does so with a
two-thirds majority in both houses. Respondents acknowledge this legislative power to
enact venue provisions. (Respondents’ Brief, p. 22; r. 7126.) But Respondents then
erroneously conflate the power of this Court with that of a district court. The constitution
grants a district court no powers of rulemaking, procedural or otherwise. It is only the
Utah Supreme Court that has rulemaking authority.
This Court, ostensibly vested with the power of making venue rules for the last
thirty-five years, has not implemented venue rules. Instead, it has allowed the legislature
to continue to enact those rules as it has done for over one hundred years. Not only has
this Court not implemented venue rules under its procedural rulemaking authority, it has
continually interpreted and enforced the venue statutes. There is zero evidence that Hale

9

v. Barker or other pre-1984 cases interpreting the change of venue statute were relying on
the constitution to do so or were in any way abrogated by the 1984 constitutional
changes. In fact, Respondents acknowledge that the Hale case does not reference the
constitution at all and provide no citation to any change of venue case that does so. See
Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 P. 928, 931 (1927). Even after the 1984 constitutional
change, this Court and other Utah courts continued to interpret and enforce the change of
venue statute. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Sevier Valley Hosp., 2010 UT App 357, ¶ 13, 246
P.3d 120; Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242, ¶ 40, 285 P.3d 1230,
rev’d on other grounds, 2014 UT 27, 332 P.3d 922; City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment
Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 53, 233 P.3d 461.
This Court’s continued reliance on the venue statutes is not misplaced, as the
venue statutes are constitutional. As noted above, the legislature can make procedural
rules, provided it does it by a two-thirds vote. Utah Const. art VIII, § 4. This new
constitutional requirement was obviously not in effect when the original venue statute
was implemented over one hundred years ago. 7 However, a simple perusal of the
legislative history of the venue statutes reveals that the change of venue statute has been
reenacted by the legislature at least twice since 1984. In 2004, the change of venue

7

It is interesting to note, though, that the predecessor of the current change of venue
statute was passed in 1901 via a unanimous vote in both houses (senate: 10 ayes, 0 nays,
8 absent and not voting; house: 40 ayes, 0 nays, 5 absent and not voting). See H.B. 42,
1901 Leg., 4th Reg. Sess. (Utah 1901); see also 1901 Utah Laws Ch. 23, § 2934. The
venue statute was revised again in 1913 via a unanimous vote in both houses (senate: 14
ayes, 0 nays, 4 absent and not voting; house: 37 ayes, 0 nays, 7 absent and not voting).
See H.B. 180, 1931 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Utah 1913); see also 1913 Utah Laws Ch. 55,
§ 2934.
10

statute, then located at Utah Code 78-13-9, was part of Senate Bill 118, which passed
both the senate and the house by a unanimous vote. 8 The most recent enactment of the
change of venue statute occurred in 2008. The statute, moved to its current location at
Utah Code 78B-3-309, was part of House Bill 78, which again passed both the house and
the senate by a unanimous vote. 9 Accordingly, there is no separation of powers issue, and
the venue statute is applicable and enforceable in this case.
The fact remains that this Court could, in the future and subject to the rulemaking
process, enact its own set of venue rules (or even a multi-district litigation rule).
However, this Court has not yet chosen to do so, and district courts cannot do so. The
district court’s transfer in this case therefore ignores the plain language of the venue
statute, exceeds the scope of its inherent authority, and, if it is an attempt to make its own
venue rule, violates the Utah Constitution.
IV.

THE TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION OF THIS CASE WITH OTHER
OPIOID CASES IN SUMMIT COUNTY WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE
JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THIS
ACTION.
Both the trial court and Respondents assume that the supposed benefits of

efficiency accompanying a transfer of venue in this case are a foregone conclusion. (See
R. 6876; see also Respondents’ Brief, 13.) However, the idea that there will be efficiency
in transferring and consolidating this case with other opioid cases in the Third District
8

The official vote tally in the senate was 28 yeas, 0 nays, and 1 absent. The official vote
tally in the house was 68 yeas, 0 nays, and 7 absent or not voting. See S.B. 118, 2004
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004).
9
The official vote tally in the house was 69 yeas, 0 nays, and 6 absent or not voting. The
official vote tally in the senate was 27 yeas, 0 nays, and 2 absent. See H.B. 78, 2008 Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2008).
11

Court is a mirage.
A close examination of the realities of the situation paint a more realistic picture of
what consolidation would actually look like. 10 There are currently over 50 defendants in
Davis County’s case alone, most of which have both a set of local counsel and national
counsel. A transfer of this case would bring those defendants, Davis County, and their
respective counsel into a morass of other similar, but distinct, opioid cases with a host of
additional different defendants, each with their own local and national counsel, along
with many other county plaintiffs, each with their own sets of counsel. Each county
plaintiff has its own causes of action asserted against many varying and different
defendants, and each has its own procedural strategy and idea as to how to move its own
case forward. Any movement forward is and will be greatly inhibited by the
consolidation of literally hundreds of opinions.
For example, at the hearing on the motion to transfer venue in this case alone,
there were many different and contradictory positions just among the Defendants who
addressed the trial court. These positions included but were not limited to (1) the
Respondents wanting the case to be transferred to Summit County for pretrial

10

In their Statement of the Case, Respondents argue that transfers and consolidations
have been a common occurrence and that “courts in numerous states—Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, and West Virginia—have coordinated the opioid lawsuits filed in different courts
throughout those states.” (Respondents’ Brief, 7.) However, the state of affairs in Utah is
entirely different from each of these states. According to Davis County’s research, each
of the states listed by Respondent either has a state multi-district litigation procedure by
which the opioid cases were consolidated or the parties in the cases agreed to
consolidation. Utah does not have a multi-district litigation procedure, and Davis County
does not agree to a transfer or consolidation in this case.
12

proceedings (r. 7123-24); (2) the Allergan Defendants wanting the case to stay in Davis
County but to be consolidated with the other counties represented by Davis County’s
counsel (r. 7146-48); (3) the Mallinckrodt Defendants filing non-oppositions to both the
motion to change venue and the motion to consolidate but deciding at the hearing that it
actually agreed with Respondents as to the transfer (r. 7170-76); and (4) the Endo
Defendants wanting the case to be consolidated for pretrial proceedings in Davis County,
to not be transferred, and to reserve the right to consolidate the cases for trial at a later
date (r. 7176-77).
Transfer (and the ultimate consolidation) would also prejudice Davis County if it
is based on the false premise that consolidation will prevent inconsistent rulings or
prevent duplicative discovery. Both of those ships have already sailed. The opioid
industry is facing thousands of lawsuits, including in every state in the nation, some of
which were filed years ago. There are already disparate decisions on substantively similar
motions, including motions to dismiss. As a result, there are already inconsistent rulings
taking place throughout the country, which of course happens in courts in Utah and
across the county every day. These differences are as likely to be due to the individual
claims and allegations made in those complaints and motions as they are to the
inconsistent application of law. Either way, the inconsistencies exist and the transfer and
consolidation of this case will not change that fact. Further, “any inconsistent rulings . . .
can be resolved on appeal.” In re: LVNV Funding, LLC, Time-Barred Proof of Claim
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Litig., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1377 (U.S. Jud.
Pan. Mult. Lit. 2015); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Falcon, No. CIV.A. 12-454, 2012
13

WL 630048, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 27, 2012) (observing that the “risk of inconsistent
rulings” is “inherent in the nature of our judicial system” and “why we have appellate
courts as well as doctrines such as res judicata”). Inconsistent rulings may actually
provide different perspectives to appellate courts.
In addition, both Respondents and the other Defendants in this case are already
addressing various discovery issues throughout the country. As part of that discovery,
Defendants are dealing with many different depositions (and other discovery) that each
party in each different jurisdiction has a right to take. The Defendants in this case have
already completed substantial document productions in federal MDL proceedings and in
cases pending outside the MDL, and they have reproduced those documents (or agreed to
produce them) in other cases precisely to avoid duplicating efforts. Further, Davis County
has been willing to actively work with Respondents and Defendants to avoid duplicative
discovery while protecting Davis County’s right to conduct its own discovery where
appropriate. Thus, Respondents and each of the other Defendants in this case are already
addressing discovery issues throughout the country, and the transfer and consolidation of
this case will not change that fact, nor will it necessarily help resolve those issues any
more efficiently going forward within the consolidated case in Utah.
It is a farce to argue that the transfer of this case and the consolidation of all of
these parties, attorneys, and positions will result in the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of this action. The consolidation in the Third District has already slowed
each of the individual cases down considerably, and joining Davis County will
significantly prejudice Davis County. If Davis County is left to try its own case in its own
14

jurisdiction, it will be free to move its case forward expeditiously, and achieve “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of [this] action.” Utah R. Civ. P. 1.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of
the district court and remand this case to the Second Judicial District Court for all
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of September 2019.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

/s/ Douglas B. Thayer
Douglas B. Thayer
Attorneys for Petitioner Davis County
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United States District Court,
N.D. Oklahoma.
Cecil R. CUMMINGS, Cathy Cummings, Plaintiffs,
v.
CONGLOBAL INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, and Conglobal Industries Holding,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants.
No. 07-CV-409-TCK-SAJ.
|
March 6, 2008.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Daniel E. Smolen, Smolen & Smolen PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for
Plaintiffs.
Don Williams Danz, James Keith Secrest, II, William Joseph
Pickard, Secrest Hill & Butler, Tulsa, OK, for Defendants.

4. Secrest Hill's overall failure to show that its legal
contentions were “warranted by existing law.”
The Court therefore ordered Secrest Hill to show cause why
it had not violated Rule 11(b)(2) and why it should not
be sanctioned accordingly. Secrest Hill thereafter filed
its Show of Cause Why it Did Not Violate Rule 1 1(b)
(2) (see Doc. 22).
“[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings
in district court and thus ... streamline the administration and
procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp ., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). It accomplishes this
purpose, in part, by imposing upon attorneys an affirmative
duty to conduct some prefiling inquiry into the facts and
law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). In deciding whether to impose
Rule 11 sanctions, the Court must apply an objective standard
and determine whether a reasonable and competent attorney
would believe in the merit of the argument presented. See
Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152,
1155 (10th Cir.1991).

2. Secrest Hill's failure to cite any procedural rule or
case law in the Motion;

Applying this standard, the Court finds that sanctions are
appropriate in the instant case. As noted in the Court's Order,
Secrest Hill's Motion failed to identify any legal or procedural
basis supporting the contentions therein, forcing the Court
and Plaintiffs to speculate as to the basis for the Motion
and to conduct research that should have been completed by
Secrest Hill prior to filing the Motion. Although it is true
that in order to comply with Rule 11, an attorney need not
provide an absolute guarantee of the correctness of the legal
theory that is advanced, the attorney is required to conduct
a reasonable inquiry into relevant law in order to comport
with Rule 11. See Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp.,
Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir.1992). Secrest Hill's failure
to provide any legal basis for its Motion suggests that no
inquiry was conducted prior to filing the Motion. See Hartz
v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir.1990) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions on attorney when it appeared that “counsel
neglected to make reasonable inquiry into the law before
filing”). Had a reasonable inquiry been conducted, it follows
that the Motion would have included some sort of legal
basis-whether that basis be in the form of existing law, the
extension, modification, or reversal or existing law, or in the
establishment of new law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2).

3. Secrest Hill's failure to conduct an “inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances” as to whether
Rule 42(a) allowed consolidation of a federal case
with a case pending in state court; and

*2 Moreover, after Plaintiffs noted in their response brief
that the Motion failed to include citation to “any Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure or precedent” (see Pls.' Resp. to Mot.
4), Secrest Hill's only legal citation in its reply brief was to

OPINION AND ORDER
TERENCE KERN, District Judge.
*1 On November 8, 2007, this Court issued an Order
denying Defendants' Motion to Consolidate and Transfer
(“Motion”). (See Motion, Doc. 10; Order, Doc. 21.) In said
Order, the Court found that counsel for Defendants, Secrest,
Hill & Butler (“Secrest Hill”), potentially violated Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) 1 in connection with the
Motion. Specifically, the Court provided Secrest Hill with
notice that the following specific conduct “appear[ed] to
violate” Rule 1 1(b)(2):
1. Secrest Hill's failure to select and clearly identify a
specific procedural basis or procedural bases for the
Motion;
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). Rule 42(a) authorizes
consolidation “[w]hen actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court.” (emphasis
added). Not only does a cursory review of the plain language
of Rule 42(a) indicate that both cases must be pending before
the same court in order for consolidation to be proper, but
relevant authority discussing Rule 42(a) also makes this point
clear. See United States v. Brandt Constr.Co., 826 F.2d 643,
647 (7th Cir.1987) (holding that federal case could not be
consolidated with improperly removed state case because
state case was not “pending before the court”); Mourik Int'l
B.V. v. Reactor Serv. Int'l, Inc., 182 F.Supp.2d 599, 602
(S.D.Tex.2002) (same); see also Glencore Ltd. v. Schnitzer
Steel Products Co., 189 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir.1999) (holding
that court erred in relying on Rule 42(a) to authorize a
joint hearing on two arbitration proceedings because the
arbitration proceedings were not actions “pending before the
court”); Williams v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5342,
2006 WL 399456, at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006)
(denying motion to consolidate cases pending in different
federal judicial districts because it was “not possible for the
Court to consolidate the Southern District [of New York]
action with any other action” that was not pending before it);
9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2382 n. 1 (2d ed.1995) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, Rule 42(a) does not support the relief requested
in the Motion. Had Secrest Hill undertaken a reasonable
inquiry, as required under Rule 11(b)(2), it would have come
across such authority and discovered that Rule 42(a) was
not a possible basis for the Motion. See Murphy v. Cuomo,
913 F.Supp. 671, 683 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (finding sanctions
appropriate when “a mere cursory review of the applicable
caselaw by plaintiff's counsel would have revealed” the fact
that plaintiff's claim had no legal viability); Watson v. City

of Salem, 934 F.Supp. 643, 664-66 (D.N.J.1995) (imposing
sanctions for failure to conduct reasonable inquiry into the
law after noting that a simple review of a relevant case
would have revealed that plaintiff's position was legally
untenable). 2
Having found that sanctions are appropriate under Rule
11(b)(2), the Court must next determine what sanction is
appropriate under Rule 11(c)(3). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)
(3) (stating “[a] sanction imposed under this rule must be
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The
sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay
a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and
other expenses directly resulting from the violation”) In the
instant case, the Court finds that Secrest Hill's failure to make
a reasonable inquiry into the legal basis for its Motion resulted
in an unnecessary expenditure of resources by both this Court
and Plaintiffs. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to
award sanctions to Plaintiffs for the reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred in conjunction with preparing their
response brief to the Motion.
*3 The issue regarding the amount of costs and fees to be
awarded to Plaintiffs is REFERRED to Magistrate Joyner for
resolution.
ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 656000

Footnotes

1

2

Rule 11(b)(2) states that in presenting a written motion to the court, an attorney certifies “that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances [that] the claims,
defenses, or other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying,
or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”
In its response to the Court's Order, Secrest Hill argues that its Motion was “warranted by existing law” because Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) states that federal courts have a “virtually
unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 819. According to Secrest, the use of the word “virtually” saves
their motion from being legally frivolous because it “turns ConGlobal's Motion from sanctionable to merely unlikely to
succeed.” (Defs.' Show of Cause Why it Did Not Violate Rule 11(b)(2) 4.) However, for the purposes of determining
whether sanctions are appropriate for failure to make a reasonable inquiry into the applicable law, Secrest Hill's argument
is of little assistance because Secrest Hill did not make any argument with regard to the Colorado River doctrine in its
Motion or in its reply brief. Rather, this doctrine was raised by Plaintiffs. As stated above, the notable absence of any
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legal authority in the Motion, coupled with the sole citation to Rule 42(a) in Defendant's reply brief, demonstrates that
Secrest Hill did not make a reasonable inquiry into applicable law.
Secrest Hill also advances United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir.1990), for the proposition that its
failure to cite relevant authority does not justify the imposition of sanctions. While Stringfellow does indeed make such a
statement, the situation presented in Stringfellow differs from the instant case in that there was at least some citation to
controlling legal authority in the challenged filing in Stringfellow, and the court was faced with deciding whether failure
to cite to potentially contrary authority rendered sanctions appropriate. See 911 F.2d at 226.

End of Document

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

Espanol v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, Not Reported in Fed. Supp. (2012)
2012 WL 12902912

2012 WL 12902912
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division.
Bernar ESPANOL, on behalf of himself
and others who are similarly situated
and consent to their inclusion, 1 Plaintiff,
v.
AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC and
Budget Rent a Car Systems, Inc., Defendants.
Case No.: 8:10–cv–944–T–35–AEP
|
Signed 10/12/2012
Attorneys and Law Firms
Dale James Morgado, Morgado P.A., Armando Aguirre Ortiz,
Phillips & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY, R. Edward
Rosenberg, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff.
Holly Elizabeth Rich, Kimberly J. Gost, Nina K. Markey,
Sarah P. Bryan, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Michael D. Jones,
Reed Smith, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Matthew J. Hank, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Philadelphia, NJ, Steven A. Siegel, Fisher
& Phillips, LLP, Ft Lauderdale, FL, Ashley Lynn Fitzgerald,
Littler Mendelson, PC, Orlando, FL, Elaine Wilkinson
Keyser, Littler Mendelson, PC, Miami, FL, Thomas E. Hill,
Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER
MARY S. SCRIVEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration
of Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer and Otherwise Consolidate
Related Cases Before this Court (the “Motion”) (Dkt. 227)
and Defendants' Response in Opposition. (Dkt. 228) Upon
consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs'
Motion (Dkt. 227), as described herein.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(a), Plaintiff moves this Court to transfer and consolidate
McWilliams v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, No. 1:12–
cv–21481–JAL (S.D. Fla.) and Tetreault v. Avis Budget Car
Rental, LLC, No. 2:12–cv–13692–NGE (E.D. Mich.) with

this action. Plaintiffs contend consolidation is appropriate
because common issues of law and fact exist, the parties
are represented by the same counsel and it would avoid
unnecessary costs and delays. Further, Plaintiffs contend
consolidation is proper because venue in the Middle District
of Florida is proper for the cases sought to be transferred.
Defendants argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42 do not provide this Court with authority to transfer a
case from another district to this Court. Defendants assert
that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) only gives a district court the power
to transfer an action to another court and does not grant
the district court authority to “force another district court
to relinquish a case.” (Dkt. 228 at 3) Moreover, Defendants
argue that Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
grants a district court the authority to manage its own docket
and “does not give one trial court the authority to control
another trial court's docket, and by its plain language, it does
not pertain to any action that is not presently ‘before the
Court.’ ” (Id. at 4) Defendants assert that Plaintiff's motion
should be denied with prejudice and Plaintiffs' counsel should
bear the fees and costs “occasioned by this motion.” (Id.)
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides

For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought or
to any district or division to which all
parties have consented.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2011). Following the plain language of
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), district courts have found that “[o]nly
a district court where an action is pending ... can order a
change of venue.” Machulas v. U.S. Air Force, No. CV406–
268, 2007 WL 781730, at * 1 (S.D. Ga. March 12, 2007); see.
e.g. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 46–
47 (2nd Cir. 1961) (“It seems clear that this language [in 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)] presupposes that the action to be transferred
is pending in the transferor court. The administration of
justice would be chaotic indeed if one district court could
order another to divest itself of jurisdiction and to transfer
a case properly before it.”); Republic Precious Metals, Inc.
v. Republic Precious Metals Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1256, 1258
(D. Minn. 1984) (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) “does not give a
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district court power to transfer a case commenced in another
jurisdiction.”). Plaintiffs cite no case law to the contrary.
*2 Here, the McWilliams and Tetreault cases are not
pending in the Middle District of Florida or before this
Court. Therefore, this Court finds that it lacks the authority to
transfer these cases to this district.
Moreover, the Court does not have the authority to consolidate
the cases with this action. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides

If actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact, the
court may: (1) join for hearing or
trial any or all matters at issue in the
actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (emphasis added). Because the
McWilliams and Tetreault cases are not pending before
this Court, this Court cannot consolidate those cases with
this action. See 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2382 (3d Ed. 2012)(“Actions pending in different

districts may not be consolidated under Rule 42(a).”);
Swindell–Dressler Corp v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3rd
Cir. 1962)(“And finally, we are of the view that a cause of
action pending in one jurisdiction cannot be consolidated with
a cause of action pending in another jurisdiction.”).
Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED
as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer and Otherwise Consolidate
Related Cases Before this Court (Dkt. 227) is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs are directed to file within fourteen (14) days
from the date of this Order a response to Defendants'
request for attorneys' fees and costs associated with this
Motion and show cause why Defendants' request for
sanctions should not be imposed for filing a facially
meritless motion. Plaintiffs' response shall be no more
than five (5) pages. If fees are ordered, the Court will set
a separate schedule for proving the amount of fees that
are warranted.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 12th day
of October 2012.
All Citations
Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2012 WL 12902912

Footnotes

1

Over 100 people have filed their consent to join this action since the commencement of this case. The Court will therefore
refer to Bernar Espanol and the other people collectively as “Plaintiffs” in this Order.

End of Document
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United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.
David CALDER, individually, and as father and
guardian of HMP, a deceased minor, Plaintiff,
v.
BLITZ U.S.A., INC., Defendant.
No. 2:07–cv–387–TC–PMW.
|
June 28, 2010.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Donald J. Winder, Jerald V. Hale, John W. Holt, Winder
& Counsel, Salt Lake City, UT, Hank Anderson, Gant A.
Grimes, Anderson Law Firm, Wichita Falls, TX, for Plaintiff.
Douglas W. Beck, Mark C. Hegarty, Scott Sayler, Shook
Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, MO, James Scott Murphy,
Garrity Graham Murphy Garofalo & Flinn, Montclair, NJ,
Shawn McGarry, Gary T. Wight, Kipp & Christian, Salt Lake
City, UT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
PAUL M. WARNER, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Chief District Judge Tena Campbell referred this case
to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) . 1 Before the court are (1) David Calder's
(“Plaintiff”) motion to compel; 2 (2) Plaintiff's motion for
terminating sanctions against Blitz U.S.A., Inc. (“Blitz”); 3
(3) Blitz's motion for leave to file a sur-reply on Plaintiff's

In his original motion, Plaintiff sought an order compelling
Blitz to respond to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 20, and 21
from Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories. Subsequently,
Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his motion with
respect to Interrogatory No. 20, 6 which the court granted. 7
Consequently, Plaintiff's motion now seeks compelled
responses to only Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 21.
Interrogatory No. 3 asked Blitz to

[i]dentify each and every engineer
and/or engineering firm or consultant,
supplier or other entity, who has
met with your company or any
of its employees or representatives
and discussed flammability of gas
vapors or flame arresters or other
detonation suppression methods for
portable plastic gasoline containers or
metal gasoline containers from 1981 to
the present. 8

Blitz originally responded by providing multiple general
objections along with a substantive response. 9 Blitz
supplemented its response by referring to its response to
Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 4, which sought
documents related to the same general subject matter covered
by Interrogatory No. 3. Blitz's response to Request for
Production No. 4 identified multiple documents by Bates
numbers.
Interrogatory No. 21 asked Blitz to

motion for terminating sanctions; 4 and (4) Blitz's motion for
leave to file certain notices under seal. 5 Pursuant to civil rule
7–1(f) of the Rules of Practice for the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, the court has concluded that
oral argument is not necessary and will determine the motions
on the basis of the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7–1(f).
The court will address the motions in turn.

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

[i]dentify each and every nonBlitz engineer, engineering company,
research
facility,
manufacturing
company, consultant or third party
entity that has met with or
corresponded with your company
representative(s) regarding flame
arresters. 10
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Blitz responded by providing the same general objections
it provided in response to Interrogatory No. 3, along with
an additional objection about the use of the phrase “flame
arresters.” 11 After providing those objections, Blitz provided
a substantive response. 12 While Blitz did identify several
specific entities it had contacted, it also indicated that it
had contact with unspecified “others.” 13 In addition, and
presumably based on its objection to the use of the phrase
“flame arresters,” Blitz's substantive response indicated that
its response was limited to those entities it had contact with
concerning “the manufacture of gasoline containers.” 14
*2 In support of his motion to compel, Plaintiff argues that
Blitz's response to Interrogatory No. 3 is inadequate because it
fails to include individuals or entities that one of its corporate
representatives identified during a deposition and fails to
meet the requirements of rule 33(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d). Plaintiff also argues
that Blitz's response to Interrogatory No. 21 is inadequate
because it fails to identify the “others” referenced in the
response and unilaterally changes the subject matter of the
interrogatory from “flame arresters” to “gasoline containers.”
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Blitz's general objections are
without merit and asks the court to conclude that Blitz
has waived certain privileges. The court will address those
arguments in turn.

Interrogatory No. 3
Plaintiff makes a one-sentence argument that Blitz's response
is inadequate because it fails to include individuals or entities
that one of its corporate representatives identified during a
deposition. In support of that argument, Plaintiff references
Exhibit L of his supporting memorandum, which consists of
two pages of deposition testimony. After reviewing those two
pages, the court is unable to find any individuals or entities
identified in the testimony that should have been included in
response to Interrogatory No. 3.
Plaintiff also argues that Blitz's reference to its response to
Request for Production No. 4 is inadequate because it fails
to meet the specificity requirement of rule 33(d). See id.
(allowing a party to specify business records as a response
to an interrogatory provided that “the burden of deriving
or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same
for either party” and that the party “specif[ies] the records
that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the

interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as
the responding party could”). Plaintiff's argument is without
merit. As indicated earlier, Blitz's response to Request for
Production No. 4, Blitz identified multiple documents by
Bates number. Plaintiff has failed to persuade the court that
such identification fails to meet the specificity requirement of
rule 33(d).
Plaintiff has failed to persuade the court that Blitz's response
to Interrogatory No. 3 is inadequate. Accordingly, this portion
of Plaintiff's motion is denied.

Interrogatory No. 21
Plaintiff argues that Blitz's response to Interrogatory No.
21 is inadequate because it fails to identify the “others”
referenced in the response. The court agrees. To the extent
that the unspecified “others” exist, Blitz should be required to
specifically identify them. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(3) (“Each
interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be
answered separately and fully in writing under oath.”).
Plaintiff also argues that Blitz's response to this interrogatory
is inadequate because it unilaterally changes the subject
matter of the interrogatory from “flame arresters” to “gasoline
containers.” Again, the court agrees. While the court
recognizes that Blitz did lodge an objection to the use of the
phrase “flame arrester” with respect to Interrogatory No. 21,
the same phrase was used in Interrogatory No. 3, and Blitz
did not object to its use there.
*3 For these reasons, the court has determined that Blitz's
response to Interrogatory No. 21 is inadequate. Therefore, this
portion of Plaintiff's motion is granted. Within thirty (30) days
of the date of this order, Blitz shall provide a full response to
Interrogatory No. 21. To the extent that unspecified “others”
do exist, Blitz shall identify them in its updated response. If no
such “others” exist, Blitz shall provide Plaintiff with a sworn
declaration to that effect. In addition, Blitz's updated response
shall respond to the subject matter identified in Interrogatory
No. 21 (i.e., “flame arresters”).

General Objections and Waiver of Privileges
Even though Blitz provided substantive responses to both
Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 21, Plaintiff also presents arguments
with respect to the general objections Blitz included in its
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responses to those interrogatories. The court has determined
that it is unnecessary to address the merits of those arguments
and objections. In the court's experience, it is commonplace
for parties responding to discovery requests to include general
objections along with their substantive responses as a way of
avoiding possible waiver of those objections. That appears to
be the case here.
Based on several of Blitz's general objections, Plaintiff
also argues that this court should conclude that Blitz has
waived the attorney-client privilege, as well as the protections
afforded to the “facts known or opinions held by” certain
of Blitz's non-testifying experts. 15 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B).
Plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony of certain Blitz
representatives to support his waiver argument. The court
again concludes that it is unnecessary to address the merits
of those arguments. The subject matter of Plaintiff's motion
to compel, Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 21, merely ask Blitz
to identify certain parties. Because the interrogatories do
not seek any sort of communications between Blitz and its
counsel, they do not implicate the attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Supboena Duces Tecum, 697
F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir.1983) (stating that the attorney-client
privilege “protects confidential communications by a client to
an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance from the
attorney in his capacity as a legal advisor” (emphasis added)
(quotations and citation omitted)). In addition, because the
interrogatories do not seek “facts known or opinions held by”
Blitz's non-testifying experts, they do not implicate rule 26(b)
(4)(B). Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B).

Request for Reasonable Expenses
Plaintiff has requested an award of reasonable expenses
incurred in connection with his motion to compel. Although
the court has granted a portion of Plaintiff's motion, the
court has determined that such an award is not appropriate or
warranted under the circumstances. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)
(C). Accordingly, Plaintiff's request is denied.

II. Plaintiff's Motion for Terminating Sanctions
*4 Before reaching the merits of this motion, the court will
first address a procedural issue raised in the motion. Plaintiff
seeks to have this motion consolidated with a similar motion
in a case pending against Blitz in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiff argues that

rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
this court with the authority to order that the motions be
consolidated. That argument is without merit. Rule 42 allows
for varying degrees of consolidation of “actions before the
court,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), which means that both actions
must be pending before the same court. See, e.g., Cummings
v. Conglobal Indus., Inc., No. 07–CV–409–TCK–SAJ, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17634, at *4–6 (N.D.Okla. March 6, 2008)
(stating that “a cursory review of the plain language of Rule
42(a) indicate[s] that both cases must be pending before the
same court in order for consolidation to be proper” and citing
to multiple sources of “relevant authority discussing Rule
42(a) [that] make[ ] this point clear”). Because this court does
not have the authority to consolidate Plaintiff's motion with
the motion pending in the case in the Eastern District of Texas,
this portion of Plaintiff's motion is denied.
The court turns next to the merits of Plaintiff's motion
for terminating sanctions. Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment
against Blitz as a sanction for alleged spoliation of evidence
and discovery abuse. Plaintiff also asserts that entry of
judgment is the only appropriate sanction because lesser
sanctions would not provide an adequate remedy.

A district court undoubtedly has
discretion to sanction a party for
failing to prosecute or defend a case,
or for failing to comply with local
or federal procedural rules. Such
sanctions may include dismissing
the party's case with prejudice or
entering judgment against the party.
But dismissal or other final disposition
of a party's claim is a severe sanction
reserved for the extreme case, and
is only appropriate where a lesser
sanction would not serve the ends of
justice.

Reed v. Nellcor Puritan Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195
(10th Cir.2002) (quotations and citations omitted); see also,
e.g., Davis v.. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1061 (10th Cir.2009)
(addressing dismissal as a sanction and stating that the Tenth
Circuit has “long held that dismissal of an action with
prejudice is a drastic sanction that should be employed only
as a last resort”). If a court determines that entry of judgment
is an appropriate sanction, it must address certain factors on
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the record. See, e.g., Gripe v.. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184,
1188 (10th Cir.2002).
The court has determined that it is unnecessary to address
those factors in this case because Plaintiff has failed to make
a sufficient factual showing that the sanction of entry of
judgment against Blitz is either appropriate or warranted.
The great majority of Plaintiff's memorandum in support of
his motion for terminating sanctions is devoted to reciting
his version of the facts to support his claims for spoliation
and discovery abuse. Blitz's response to that memorandum
disputes nearly every one of Plaintiff's factual allegations.
Not only are Plaintiff's claims based on disputed factual
issues, it is far from clear whether the evidence Plaintiff
relies upon is admissible. The court has determined that those
disputed factual issues and evidentiary questions will be more
appropriately resolved during the trial phase of this case, not
as part of a discovery-related motion for sanctions. For these
reasons, Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions against
Blitz is denied.

III. Blitz's Motion for Leave to File Sur–Reply
*5 After Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions was
fully briefed, Blitz filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply
on that motion. Because it was unnecessary for the court to
consider Blitz's sur-reply in reaching a ruling on Plaintiff's
motion for terminating sanctions, Blitz's motion for leave to
file a sur-reply has been rendered moot.

IV. Blitz's Motion for Leave to File Notices Under Seal
In this motion, Blitz seeks an order from the court allowing
it to file certain notices under seal. Blitz asserts that the
notices contain “highly sensitive and confidential information
regarding Blitz, as well as detailed information regarding

invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.” 16
In his response, Plaintiff does not focus on whether Blitz
should be allowed to file the notices under seal. Instead,
Plaintiff focuses on whether the notices should be allowed
or will be admissible in this case. Plaintiff's arguments are
misplaced. As Blitz has noted in its reply, the only issue
raised by its motion is whether the notices can be filed
under seal. Because nothing in Blitz's motion seeks a judicial
determination about the propriety or admissibility of the
notices, that issue is not before the court.
For the reasons set forth the motion, and based upon good
cause appearing, Blitz's motion to file notices under seal is
granted.
In summary, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's motion to compel 17 is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART, as detailed above. Plaintiff's
request for an award of reasonable expenses incurred in
connection with his motion to compel is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions against Blitz 18
is DENIED.
3. Blitz's motion for leave to file a sur-reply on Plaintiff's
motion for terminating sanctions 19 is MOOT.
4. Blitz's motion for leave to file notices under seal 20 is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 2639971

Footnotes

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

See docket no. 17.
See docket no. 125.
See docket no. 134.
See docket no. 167.
See docket no. 170.
See docket no. 141.
See docket no. 142.
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Docket no. 126 at 13.
See id.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 18.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Although Plaintiff also makes some references to the work-product doctrine in the memorandum in support of his motion,
he does not present any argument that Blitz waived the protections of that doctrine. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no reference
to the work-product doctrine in his reply memorandum. Accordingly, the court will not address that issue here.
Docket no. 170 at 1.
See docket no. 125.
See docket no. 134.
See docket no. 167.
See docket no. 170.
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
E.D. Louisiana.
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
v.
Timothy J. FALCON, et al.
Civil Action No. 12–454.
|
Feb. 27, 2012.
Attorneys and Law Firms
James Alcee Brown, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for
Exxon Mobil Corporation.

ORDER
ELDON E. FALLON, District Judge.
*1 The Court has pending before it Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, Alternatively to Stay and Motion for Sanctions
(Rec.Doc.13). Plaintiff has filed a response. The Court has
reviewed the briefs and the applicable law and now issues this
Order and Reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
This unusual case arises from a state-court evidentiary
and procedural dispute surrounding an allegedly privileged
document. Plaintiff Exxon Mobil Corporation is a defendant
in Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (“NORM”)
cases pending in Louisiana state court. Defendants are three
attorneys and their law firms who represent plaintiffs in statecourt NORM litigation against Exxon.
The allegedly privileged Document was inadvertently
produced by Exxon to Defendants Falcon and Sprague on
August 28, 2008, in response to discovery in the state-court
NORM litigation, and Exxon wants it back. The Document,
which has been filed into the record under seal, is described
by Exxon as a memorandum written by in-house legal counsel
that “contains ... confidential legal advice ... regarding the use
and disposition of tables reflecting results of air sample tests
performed by an ExxonMobil industrial hygienist in 1987 on
an experimental pipe cleaning unit developed by Intracoastal

Pipe Repair and Supply Company (“ITCO”).” (Cmpl. at ¶ 6).
Defendants apparently contend that the Document is relevant
in NORM cases with respect to Exxon's knowledge and to
punitive damages.
According to the Complaint, in December, 2009, Exxon
discovered that the Document had been inadvertently
produced. On December 8, 2009, Exxon sent a letter
notifying Defendant Falcon of the inadvertent production
and demanding its return pursuant to Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 1424(D). 1 Exxon also submitted
a privilege log identifying the Document as subject to
attorney-client privilege and sent revised CDs which clawed
back the Document. On December 15, 2009, Defendant
Falcon returned the original CDs but retained a copy of the
Document.
Subsequently, according to Exxon Defendants Falcon and
Sprague provided copies of the Document to other attorneys.
The Document was offered as evidence (by an attorney not
named as a Defendant in this case) in a NORM trial against
Exxon in the 24th JDC for the Parish of Jefferson. According
to the Complaint, in that trial the Document was held to be
privileged and inadmissible. Defendants Falcon and Sprague
also allegedly provided a copy of the Document to Defendant
Buck, who then offered the Document in a NORM trial
against Exxon on September 20, 2011 in Civil District Court
for the Parish of Orleans. The Document was not admitted
at that trial, although the parties dispute why it was excluded
and whether the Document was held to be privileged.
On January 27, 2012, Defendant Sprague notified Exxon that
he intends to use the Document in another upcoming trial
against Exxon in the 24th JDC scheduled to begin on March 5,
2012. The Defendants indicate that prior to receiving Exxon's
complaint in this case, they had prepared and intended to
file a motion in limine in the state court proceeding seeking
permission from the state court to use the document.
*2 On Friday, February 17, 2012, Plaintiff Exxon filed
this case against Defendants Falcon, Sprague, Buck, and
their respective law firms. In the complaint, Exxon seeks
a declaratory judgment that the Document is protected by
the attorney-client privilege and that the privilege has not
been waived. Exxon also seeks injunctive relief requiring
Defendants to return the Document and to refrain from
disseminating it or attempting to use it at trial. On the same
day, Exxon filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction, arguing that there is an immediate
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risk of irreparable harm if Defendants further disseminate
the Document. The Court denied the request for a temporary
restraining order and set a preliminary injunction hearing for
Wednesday, February 29, 2012.
II. PRESENT MOTION
Defendants now move for relief from Exxon's complaint and
motion for a preliminary injunction. They essentially argue
that this United States District Court is not an appropriate
forum for resolving an evidentiary matter that can and should
be resolved in already-pending cases in state court. Therefore,
Defendants contend that either dismissal, abstention, or a stay
of this proceeding is warranted.
Exxon responds that neither abstention, dismissal, or a stay
are appropriate. It contends that the Anti–Injunction Act and
the Colorado River abstention doctrine do not apply to these
facts, and that the Court should issue injunctive relief to
prevent potential irreparable harm.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
An appropriate resolution of Defendants' motion follows
from a clear understanding of the procedural posture of this
case. The Court will explain that posture and the outcome it
suggests. Then, the Court will address its deep concerns with
the question of subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
There are a number of NORM cases pending in various
Louisiana trial courts, including one set for trial on March
5, 2012, in the 24th JDC for the Parish of Jefferson.
As mentioned, Defendant Buck intends to introduce the
Document at that trial and intends to file a motion in limine
with that court addressing the admissibility of the Document.
The state trial court is fully capable of resolving the issue. If
the Document is found to be privileged, the Court can identify
no reason why Exxon cannot seek an order from that Court
compelling Defendants to return it, and to seek sanctions if
Defendants fail to comply. If the Document is held not to be
privileged, Exxon may pursue any appeals available to it in
the Louisiana state court system. Either way, the Louisiana
state courts which host the NORM litigation are fully capable
of vetting the issue and according Exxon whatever relief is
appropriate.
Instead, Exxon has attempted to short-circuit the normal
functioning of the Louisiana state courts by seeking a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from this federal
court. Exxon wants to preempt every Louisiana state court

and resolve the privilege issue “in one forum rather than
30 different jurisdictions.” (Rec. Doc. 16 at 3). It argues
that “[o]nly by obtaining injunctive relief requested herein
will Exxon be assured a consistent ruling on this important
issue.” (Rec. Doc. 16 at 7).

The 24th JDC is fully empowered and competent to rule
on the procedural and evidentiary matters arising out of
the inadvertent production and retention of the Document.
Indeed, the 24th JDC is likely better equipped to resolve
those issues, given its greater familiarity with the factual
background of the case and the procedural and evidentiary
rules of Louisiana. Moreover, the state court has jurisdiction
over the underlying dispute and supervisory authority
over the counsel involved. Exxon has not explained why
it cannot obtain all of the relief it seeks in state court.
Accordingly, the Court finds it prudential and appropriate
to stay this case and the preliminary injunction hearing
pending treatment of the issues in the first instance by the
24th JDC in the case scheduled to begin on March 5, 2012.
*3 In addition to being a common-sense resolution, a stay is
also appropriate because the Court has grave doubts whether
it has subject matter jurisdiction. Although the parties argue
in terms of the Anti–Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, or
the Colorado River abstention doctrine, 2 those analytical
frameworks miss the point. Applying the Anti–Injunction
Act or an abstention doctrine presupposes subject matter
jurisdiction over a case. See Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534
F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir.2008) (“It must be remembered that
the anti-injunction act limits federal remedies without ousting
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (quotation omitted);
Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697,
701 (5th Cir.2006) (“Abstention implies that there is subject
matter jurisdiction but for some other policy reason, a court
refrains from exercising that power to hear the merits of
a case.”). The Court must always be assured that it has
subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Free v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir.1999). As a corollary, the
Court is “obliged also to consider threshold questions of
justiciability.” See Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex
rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 566 (5th Cir.2008); see also Orix
Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir.2000)
(“When considering a declaratory judgment action .... the
court must determine whether the declaratory action is
justiciable.”).
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As explained above, Exxon wants to divert a discrete
evidentiary issue from a pending state case, have this Court
prohibit Defendants from attempting to introduce a piece
of evidence in state court, and have that decision bind all
Louisiana state courts. Although Exxon attempts to cast
this case as arising from Defendants' personal failure as
attorneys to comply with professional and ethical duties, it is
fundamentally an evidentiary and procedural dispute related
to the admissibility of a document in a case not pending before
this Court. Needless to say, there are severe practical and
conceptual difficulties with bringing this kind of dispute to
federal court.
Strictly as a practical matter, entertaining cases like this would
dramatically expand the Court's docket. The district courts
would be swamped if state-court litigants could resort to
federal court to resolve the myriad legal and evidentiary
questions that arise in the regular course of litigation. Every
state court case would become subject to exponential parallel
litigation if the parties could jump to the federal courts
whenever they found it convenient or favorable to have some
sliver of the case considered by a different forum. This is
neither desirable nor efficient.
But conceptually, Exxon's proposal is even more difficult to
reconcile with fundamental principles of our federal legal
system. First, it is troubling to think that the Court could issue
an evidentiary ruling with binding effect on a state-court case
not otherwise subject to federal-court jurisdiction, simply
because a litigant is non-diverse from the opposing party's
counsel. Second, it is likewise confusing to imagine that every
single dispute over the law that can arise in the course of a
case somehow constitutes an independent case or controversy
sufficient to give rise to federal court jurisdiction. Third, and
most importantly, the relief sought could seriously impinge
on the proper balance of comity and federalism between the
concurrent state and federal judicial systems. This Court does

not sit as some kind of quasi-appellate forum dictating state
evidentiary and procedural law to the state trial courts.
*4 Exxon simply has not explained why this Court should
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and why Exxon lacks
a reasonable legal remedy through the Louisiana courts.
Certainly there is a risk of inconsistent rulings between trial
courts with concurrently pending cases that raise repetitive
issues. That is inherent in the nature of our judicial system and
it is why we have appellate courts as well as doctrines such
as res judicata. While one may conceive of a legal system in
which the first court to resolve an issue binds all other courts
and all other parties for all time, that is not the system in which
we operate.
In short, the relief sought here is possibly unprecedented.
Certainly, Exxon has not cited a single case remotely
suggesting that this Court can interfere with thirty or more
cases pending in state court and decree how those courts
should resolve a matter of state evidentiary and procedural
law. At a later date, and upon a full opportunity to brief these
issues, dismissal of Exxon's complaint as non-justiciable
may be warranted. At the moment, it is enough to stay all
proceedings and to permit the state courts to act without
interference from this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's
motion (Rec.Doc.13) is GRANTED IN PART. This case is
stayed until further Order of the Court. Defendants' Motion to
Expedite (Rec.Doc.14) is MOOT. The preliminary injunction
hearing scheduled for Wednesday, February 29, 2012 at 3:30
p.m. is CANCELLED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 630048

Footnotes

1
2

Article 1424(D) states that under certain circumstances inadvertent disclosure in litigation of a privileged document does
not waive the privilege. The article explains the procedure by which the discloser may request its return; the recipient of
the document must return or safeguard the privileged document but may assert a waiver. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1424(D).
The Fifth Circuit “applies one of two tests when reviewing a district court's exercise of its discretion to stay because
of an ongoing parallel state proceeding.” New England Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 561 F.3d 392, 394 (5th Cir.2009). A purely
declaratory action “affords a district court broad discretion” to defer to a parallel state proceeding. See id. “However, when
an action involves coercive relief, the district court must apply the abstention standard set forth in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States,” under which “the district court's discretion to dismiss is ‘narrowly circumscribed’
and is governed by a broader ‘exceptional circumstances' standard.” Id. at 394–95 (citation and quotations omitted).

© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Falcon, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 630048
The complaint seeks injunctive relief as well as a declaratory judgment, and therefore the Court cannot apply the more
discretionary approach. See Sw. Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir.1994) (“Inclusion of these
coercive remedies [for the breach of contract in the form of damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief] indisputably
removes this suit from the ambit of a declaratory judgment action.”). Colorado River governs abstention in this case.
Defendants cite PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.1973), which predates Colorado River.
The analysis in PPG Industries of “a manifest policy against dual litigation which ... has given rise to a discretionary
power in the federal courts to stay proceedings in equity suits in deference to a parallel state action” may be outdated.
See id. at 679–80.
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